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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are to determine whether the continuation of a 
sheriff 's sale, following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, 
violates the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.S 362(a), 
and whether a Pennsylvania rule of civil procedure that 
permits oral notice of the continuation and rescheduled 
sale date is sufficient to protect a debtor's due process 
rights. The bankruptcy court held that the postponement of 
the sale of property owned by the debtor, Harvey Taylor, did 
not violate S 362(a) and that Taylor's due process rights had 
not been violated by a subsequent sheriff 's sale. The 
district court dismissed Taylor's appeal. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Taylor and his wife purchased 20 acres of land in 
Westmoreland County from Martha Ballantine for 
$72,450.00. A note and mortgage were executed on 
December 16, 1981, with the entire purchase price to be 
paid by September 18, 1982. Thomas McCune Slick, as 
Ballantine's executor, instituted foreclosure proceedings in 
1989 because Taylor had defaulted on the mortgage. 
 
Several unsuccessful attempts were made to effectuate 
personal service of the complaint in mortgage foreclosure. 
An order was entered, on August 31, 1990, permitting Slick 
to make substitute service on Taylor by certified and 
regular mail and by posting the property. The order further 
stated: 
 
       Should this case proceed to execution and sale, this 
       Order for Service shall apply to the Notice pursuant to 
       Rule 3129 [of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
       Procedure] which is required to be served upon 
       [Taylor], allowing perfection of service in the same 
       manner as provided for herein. [Slick] ha[s] conducted 
       a reasonable search for [Taylor] but ha[s] been unable 
       to further locate [him] beyond [his] residence in 
       McKeesport, Pennsylvania. The manner of service 
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       provided for herein is the most reasonably likely 
       method of achieving service in this case. 
 
App. at 176a. The sheriff served the notice and complaint 
in accordance with this order. A default judgment was 
entered against Taylor on October 24, 1990, in the amount 
of $43,863.61. A Writ of Execution in Mortgage Foreclosure 
was issued and served by certified and regular mail and 
posted on the property. The Writ was stayed and reissued 
on several occasions, as a result of agreements between the 
parties that Taylor would make payment. Taylor made only 
sporadic payments from 1990 through 1994. 
 
Taylor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on 
February 3, 1995. The petition was dismissed on February 
22 for failure to file required documents. Slick filed another 
Writ of Execution on May 31, 1995, in accordance with the 
requirements of the August 31, 1990 order and Taylor 
received notice of the filing of the writ. 
 
A sheriff's sale was scheduled for September 5, 1995, 
but on September 1, 1995, Taylor filed a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition. By oral public announcement at the 
time and location of the proposed sheriff's sale, the sale 
was continued to October 23, 1995, in accordance with 
Rule 3129.3(b), Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which states: 
 
       If the sale is stayed, continued, postponed or 
       adjourned to a date certain within one hundred days of 
       the scheduled sale, and public announcement thereof, 
       including the new date, is made to the bidders 
       assembled at the time and place originally fixed for the 
       sale, no new notice shall be required, but there may be 
       only one such stay, continuance, postponement or 
       adjournment without new notice. 
 
On October 17, 1995, Slick sought relief from the 
automatic stay of the sale. Although Taylor received notice 
of Slick's motion for relief which did not state that the sale 
was scheduled for October 23, he did not respond or attend 
the hearing before the bankruptcy court. Slick obtained 
relief from the stay, and the sale took place as scheduled. 
Slick was the high bidder for the property. The sheriff's 
deed was executed on January 16, 1996, and recorded the 
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following day. Taylor's bankruptcy petition was dismissed 
on December 21, 1995, reopened and reinstated nunc pro 
tunc on January 8, 1996, and dismissed again on July 9, 
1996. 
 
Taylor filed an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy 
court on December 31, 1996, and contended, inter alia, 
that the continuance of the sheriff's sale, after he had filed 
his bankruptcy petition, violated 11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(1) and 
therefore voided the sale, and that the subsequent sale was 
conducted without proper notice, in violation of his due 
process rights. 
 
The bankruptcy court granted Slick's motion to dismiss 
the adversary complaint on the basis that there had been 
no violation of the automatic stay rule set forth in 11 
U.S.C. S 362(a)(1), and that Appellant had received 
adequate notice under bankruptcy rules and Pennsylvania 
law. Appellant withdrew his remaining claims in order to 
appeal the issues presented here. After oral argument, the 
district court dismissed Appellant's appeal. 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 
28 U.S.C. S 158(d). We review the bankruptcy court's 
factual findings for clear error, but conduct plenary review 
of the bankruptcy court's and district court's legal 
conclusions. In re Cohen, 106 F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. 
 
This court has not previously addressed whether the 
postponement or continuation of a sheriff's sale violates 
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. S 362(a). We are 
persuaded by a consistent line of cases from other courts, 
however, and hold that the continuance of a sheriff's sale 
in accordance with state law procedure during the 
pendency of an automatic stay does not violate S 362(a)(1). 
See, e.g., In re Peters, 101 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1996); In re 
Roach, 660 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Fritz, 225 B.R. 
218 (E.D. Wash. 1997); Zeoli v. RIHT Mortgage Corp., 148 
B.R. 698 (D.N.H. 1993); In re Tome, 113 B.R. 626 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1990); Workingmen's Savings and Loan Ass'n of 
Dellwood Corp. v. Kestner, 652 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1994); see also In re Roche, 228 B.R. 102, 103-104 (Bankr. 
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M.D. Pa. 1998) ("[E]very court that has studied this specific 
issue (and has not been reversed) has found no violation."). 
 
In relevant part, 11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(1) provides: 
 
       (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
       a petition filed under section 301, 302 or 303 of this 
       title . . . operates as a stay applicable to all entities, of 
       -- 
 
       (1) the commencement or continuation, including the 
       issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, 
       administrative, or other action or proceeding against 
       the Debtor that was or could have been commenced 
       before the commencement of the case. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(1) (emphasis added). "The primary 
purposes of the automatic stay provisions are to effectively 
stop all creditor collection efforts, stop all harassment of a 
debtor seeking relief, and to maintain the status quo 
between the debtor and [his] creditors, thereby affording the 
parties and the Court an opportunity to appropriately 
resolve competing economic interests in an orderly and 
effective way." Zeoli, 148 B.R. at 700 (emphasis added). We 
must therefore decide whether a continuation of a sheriff's 
sale serves to maintain the status quo between the debtor 
and his creditors or whether it constitutes "a judicial, 
administrative, or other action or proceeding" prohibited by 
S 362(a)(1). 
 
According to the principle of noscitur a sociis, the word 
"continuation," as used in S 362(a)(1), must be read in 
conjunction with other words that surround it, such as 
"commencement." Upon such examination, it becomes 
apparent that the filing of a bankruptcy petition prohibits 
the beginning ("commencement") of a judicial proceeding 
and the carrying forward ("continuation") of a proceeding 
that has already begun. 
 
The "continuation" of a sheriff's sale, on the other hand, 
connotes the postponement of a proceeding, and effectuates 
the purposes of S 362(a)(1) by preserving the status quo 
until the bankruptcy process is completed or until the 
creditor obtains relief from the automatic stay. See 
Workingmen's Savings, 652 A.2d at 328 ("Postponement 
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notices which specify a new sale date merely preserve the 
status quo between creditor and debtor."); see also Zeoli, 
148 B.R. at 701 ("The postponement of a foreclosure sale is 
certainly an `act.' But it is not an act in `continuation' of a 
proceeding `against the debtor' prohibited by S 362(a)(1). 
Rather, it is more appropriately characterized as an act in 
preservation of a stayed proceeding."). A postponement 
notice does not, by itself, permit the rescheduled sheriff's 
sale to occur. So long as the bankruptcy petition is pending 
before the bankruptcy court, a creditor must apply for and 
obtain relief from the stay before it can proceed with the 
sale on the date certain. Rule 3129.3(b), Pennsylvania 
Rules of Civil Procedure, preserves the status quo and 
permits the creditor to avoid duplicative foreclosure costs 
that would eventually be deducted from the proceeds of the 
sale (to the disadvantage of the debtor). See Zeoli, 148 B.R. 
at 701. It is therefore clear that Rule 3129.3(b) comports 
with S 362(a)(1). 
 
Once Taylor filed his bankruptcy petition here, the sale 
was postponed. Although a new proposed sale date was 
announced, no act had occurred that prejudiced Taylor or 
otherwise altered his position with respect to the property. 
In accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, Slick then sought 
relief from the stay and served notice on Taylor. Taylor did 
not respond to the motion for relief, and relief was granted 
Slick pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 362(d).1 Upon receiving relief 
from the stay, Slick was permitted to proceed with the 
sheriff's sale so long as notice requirements had been met. 
The bankruptcy court properly rejected Taylor's argument 
that the continuation of the sheriff's sale violated 
S 362(a)(1). 
 
III. 
 
Taylor's argument that Pennsylvania Rule 3129.3(b) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In relevant part, S 362(d) states: 
 
       (d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a 
hearing, 
       the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under 
subsection 
       (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, 
or 
       conditioning such stay-- . . . . 
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violates the Due Process Clause likewise fails. To be sure, 
Taylor is entitled to due process with respect to the 
sheriff's sale of his property, see First Eastern Bank v. The 
Campstead, Inc., 637 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) 
(mortgage foreclosures are subject to due process 
requirements), but Taylor exaggerates the process he is due 
under the Constitution. Because Taylor is not entitled to 
individualized written notice of the rescheduled sale, and 
because proper notice was provided pursuant to Rule 
3129.3(b), we will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
" `[A]dequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed 
termination' of a constitutionally protected liberty or 
property interest must be afforded to individuals prior to 
the deprivation." Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 172 (3d 
Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. American 
Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977 
(1999) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-268 
(1970)). To satisfy due process requirements, the notice 
provided must be "reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Chemetron 
Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995); First 
Eastern Bank, 637 A.2d at 1366. The level of notice to be 
given, however, depends on the interest at issue because 
"due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 
Taylor concedes that he received notice of the original 
sale and states that he voluntarily chose not to attend the 
September 5, 1995 sale in reliance on the bankruptcy 
petition he had filed four days earlier. His decision not to 
attend the original sale in which notice was given in 
accordance with Rule 3129.3(b), however, does not amount 
to a violation of due process. 
 
We hold that the notice requirement contained in Rule 
3129.3(b) is reasonably calculated to reach interested 
parties to a sheriff's sale. The interested parties are the 
debtor, the creditor and the potential bidders for the 
property. In light of the Pennsylvania Superior Court's 
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teachings in Workingmen's Savings, supra, it is reasonable 
to expect that notice of a continuation of a sale will be 
announced at the scheduled sale date--because potential 
bidders will likely be unaware that the debtor hasfiled a 
bankruptcy petition--but it is not reasonable for a debtor to 
choose not to attend the scheduled sale simply because he 
knows that the sale will not be consummated at that time 
because of his ex parte intervention in the bankruptcy 
court. Because it can be expected that the debtor, the 
creditor and potential bidders will attend the sale, oral 
notice as provided by Rule 3129.3(b) comports with notions 
of due process. 
 
Although one in Taylor's position is entitled to believe 
that the sheriff's sale will not be consummated on the 
original date, he is not entitled to believe that no sale will 
occur until his bankruptcy petition has been adjudicated. 
Not only does the oral notice of the date of the rescheduled 
sale comport with due process, but the debtor's rights are 
further protected by the requirements that he receive notice 
both of the hearing on the motion for relief from the 
automatic stay and of the subsequently entered order lifting 
the stay. Those two notices serve to further alert the debtor 
to the fact that the executing creditor is attempting to 
effectuate the sheriff's sale without further delay and 
expense. Taylor, however, chose to lie doggo. He chose to 
ignore the motion to lift the stay, the hearing held before 
the bankruptcy court and the order lifting the stay. 2 He 
chose not to utilize the courts of Pennsylvania to challenge 
the sale. He took no action to contest the legitimacy of the 
October 23, 1995 sale until a year and two months later 
when he filed his complaint in the bankruptcy court on 
December 31, 1996. Taylor's studied attempts to remain 
elusive throughout the foreclosure process may not serve as 
a basis for a ruling that he suffered a deprivation of his 
right to due process. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Taylor argues in his complaint that he did not receive notice of the 
hearing on the motion to lift the stay. The district court deemed him to 
have received notice based upon the presumption that arises from the 
mailing of a properly addressed notice, and Taylor does not challenge 
this ruling before us. Moreover, Taylor does not allege that he failed to 
receive notice of the order lifting the stay. 
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Taylor's conduct aside, the Pennsylvania rule must be 
evaluated in conjunction with the purpose of the notice 
requirement in the context of a sheriff's sale. The 
continuation of a sheriff's sale and public announcement of 
a new date are intended to assure notice to bidders 
interested in the subject property. See, e.g., Greater 
Pittsburgh Business Development Corp. v. Braunstein, 568 
A.2d 1261, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The debtor's true 
interest is to ensure that notice is given to potential 
bidders, rather than to ensure that the debtor receives 
notice, because the debtor is generally just a spectator who 
is concerned that the sale, whenever it may occur, brings 
the highest sale price possible. See id.; Investors & Lenders 
Ltd. v. Finnegan, 592 A.2d 1244, 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1991). Rule 3129.3(b) strikes a proper balance between 
providing notice to interested parties and allowing the 
creditor to avoid paying duplicative fees. 
 
Here, Taylor suffered no constitutional disadvantage as a 
result of his voluntary absence from the originally 
scheduled sale. For him to contend now that he was 
prejudiced by his failure to receive notice of the new sale 
date when it was given is truly disingenuous. Taylor has 
not contended that he was deprived of the ability to bid on 
the property, nor has he established that the notice given 
resulted in the property being sold at too low a price 
because bidders were not aware of the continued sale date. 
Even were he to present such a contention, it would 
necessarily fail on the facts presented here. See, e.g., 
Workingmen's Savings, 652 A.2d at 329 ("Because the 
sheriff's sale was properly held on due notice, appellants 
were not improperly denied an opportunity to cure their 
default. The opportunity to cure their default was lost by 
[appellants'] failure to tender the amount necessary to 
reinstate the mortgage and not because of any defect in the 
foreclosure proceedings."). Taylor had several opportunities, 
before filing his adversary complaint, to contest the validity 
of the sale. See Roche, 228 B.R. at 105 ("Even should there 
have been some injustice by reason of the circumstances of 
the sale, nothing prevented raising this issue before the 
county court under Pa.R.C.P. 3132, once the Debtors 
became aware of the sale."). He chose not to avail himself 
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of these opportunities, and as a result, we conclude that he 
cannot prevail in his due process claim. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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